There is wide support in logic, philosophy, and psychology for the hypothesis that the probability of the indicative conditional of natural language, Ppif A then Bq, is the conditional probability of B given A, PpB|Aq. We identify a conditional which is such that Ppif A then Bq " PpB|Aq with de Finetti's conditional event, B|A. An objection to making this identification in the past was that it appeared unclear how to form compounds and iterations of conditional events. In this paper, we illustrate how to overcome this objection with a probabilistic analysis, based on coherence, of these compounds and iterations. We interpret the compounds and iterations as conditional random quantities which, given some logical dependencies, may reduce to conditional events. We show how the inference to B|A from A and B can be extended to compounds and iterations of both conditional events and biconditional events. Moreover, we determine the respective uncertainty propagation rules. Finally, we make some comments on extending our analysis to counterfactuals.
Introduction
There is wide agreement in logic and philosophy that the indicative conditional of natural language, if A then B, cannot be adequately represented as the material conditional of binary logic, logically equivalent to s A _ B (not-A or B) [26] . Psychological studies have also shown that ordinary people do not judge the probability of if A then B, Ppif A then Bq, to be the probability of the material conditional, Pp s A_ Bq, but rather tend to assess it as the conditional probability of B given A, PpB|Aq, or at least to converge on this assessment [5, 28, 30, 55, 70, 71, 83] . These psychological results have been taken to imply [5, 29, 41, 64, 71, 72] , that if A then B is best represented, either as the probability conditional of Adams [3] , or as the conditional event B|A of de Finetti [21, 22] , the probability of which is PpB|Aq. We will adopt the latter view in the present paper and base our analysis on conditional events and coherence (for related analyses, specifically on categorical syllogisms, squares of opposition under coherence and on generalized argument forms see [42, 77, 76, 82] ). One possible objection to holding that Ppif A then Bq " PpB|Aq is that it is supposedly unclear how this relation extends to compounds of conditionals and makes sense of them [24, 26, 87] . Yet consider: 
The above conjunction appears to make sense, as does the following seemingly even more complex conditional construction [24] : If she will be angry if her son gets a B, then she will be furious if he gets a C.
We will show below, in reply to the objection, how to give sense to (1) and (2) in terms of compound conditionals. Specifically, we will interpret (1) as a conjunction of two conditionals (a|b and f |c) and (2) in terms of a conditional whose antecedent (a|b) and consequent ( f |c) are both conditionals (if a|b, then f |c). But we note first that the iterated conditional (2) validly follows from the conjunction (1) by the form of inference we will call centering which, as we will show, can be extended to the compounds of conditionals (see Section 3 below). We point out that our framework is quantitative rather than a logical one. Indeed in our approach, syntactically conjoined and iterated conditionals in natural language are analyzed as conditional random quantities, which can sometimes reduce to conditional events, given logical dependencies ( [47, 50] ). For instance, the biconditional event A||B, which we will define by pB|Aq^pA|Bq, reduces to the conditional pA^Bq|pA _ Bq. Moreover, the notion of biconditional centering will be given. The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we give some preliminaries on the notions of coherence and pentailment for conditional random quantities, which assume values in r0, 1s. In Section 3, after recalling the notions of conjoined conditional and iterated conditional, we study the p-validity of centering in the case where the basic events are replaced by conditionals. In Section 4 we give some results on coherence, by determining the lower and upper bounds for the conclusion of two-premise centering; we also examine the classical case by obtaining the same lower and upper bounds. In Section 5, after recalling the classical biconditional introduction rule, we present an analogue in terms of conditional events (biconditional AND rule); we also obtain one-premise and two-premise biconditional centering. In Section 6 we determine the lower and upper bounds for the conclusion of two-premise biconditional centering. In Section 7 we investigate reversed inferences (i.e., inferences from the conclusion to its premises), by determining the lower and upper bounds for the premises of the biconditional AND rule. Section 8 sketches how to apply results of this paper to study selected counterfactuals, and remark that the Import-Export Principle is not valid in our approach which allows us to avoid Lewis' notorious triviality results. Section 9 concludes with some remarks on future work. Further details which expand Section 2 are given in Appendix A.
Some preliminaries
The coherence-based approach to probability and to other uncertain measures has been adopted by many authors (see, e.g., [7, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 38, 49, 71, 88] ); we recall below some basic aspects on the notions of coherence and of p-entailment. In Appendix A we will give further details on coherence of probability and prevision assessments.
Events and constituents
In our approach events represent uncertain facts described by (non ambiguous) logical propositions. An event A is a two-valued logical entity which is either true (T ), or false (F). The indicator of an event A is a two-valued numerical quantity which is 1, or 0, according to whether A is true, or false, respectively, and we use the same symbol to refer to an event and its indicator. We denote by Ω the sure event and by H the impossible one (notice that, when necessary, the symbol H will denote the empty set). Given two events A and B, we denote by A^B the logical intersection, or conjunction, of A and B; moreover, we denote by A _ B the logical union, or disjunction, of A and B. To simplify notations, in many cases we denote the conjunction of A and B (and its indicator) as AB; of course, AB coincides with the product of A and B. We denote by s A the negation of A. Of course, the truth values for conjunctions, disjunctions and negations are obtained by applying the propositional logic. Given any events A and B, we simply write A Ď B to denote that A logically implies B, that is A s B " H, which means that A and s B cannot both be true. Given n events A 1 , . . . , A n , as A i _ s A i " Ω , i " 1, . . . , n, by expanding the expression
that is the sure event Ω is represented as the disjunction of 2 n logical conjunctions. By discarding the conjunctions which are impossible (if any), the remaining ones are the constituents generated by A 1 , . . . , A n . Of course, the constituents are pairwise logically incompatible; then, they are a partition of Ω. We recall that A 1 , . . . , A n are logically independent when the number of constituents generated by them is 2 n . Of course, in case of some logical dependencies among A 1 , . . . , A n , the number of constituents is less than 2 n . For instance, given two events A, B, with A Ď B, the constituents are:
If not stated otherwise, we assume logical independence throughout the paper.
Conditional events and coherent probability assessments
Given two events E, H, with H ‰ H, the conditional event E|H is defined as a three-valued logical entity which is true (T), or false (F), or void (V), according to whether EH is true, or s EH is true, or s H is true, respectively. The notion of logical inclusion among events has been generalized to conditional events by Goodman and Nguyen in [52] (see also [49] Given a real function P : K Ñ R, where K is an arbitrary family of conditional events, let us consider a subfamily F n " tE 1 |H 1 , . . . , E n |H n u of K, and the vector P n " pp 1 , . . . , p n q, where
. . , n, by expanding the expression
we can represent Ω as the disjunction of 3 n logical conjunctions, some of which may be impossible. The remaining ones are the constituents generated by F n and, of course, are a partition of Ω. We denote by C 1 , . . . , C m the constituents which logically imply H n and (if H n ‰ Ω) by C 0 the remaining constituent s H n " s H 1¨¨¨s H n , so that
In the context of betting scheme, with the pair pF n , P n ) we associate the random gain G " ř n i"1 s i H i pE i´pi q, where s 1 , . . . , s n are n arbitrary real numbers. We observe that G is the difference between the amount that you receive, ř n i"1 s i pE i H i`pi s H i q, and the amount that you pay, ř n i"1 s i p i , and represents the net gain from engaging each transaction H i pE i´pi q, the scaling and meaning (buy or sell) of the transaction being specified by the magnitude and the sign of s i respectively. Let g h be the value of G when C h is true; then G P D " tg 0 , g 1 , . . . , g m u. Of course, g 0 " 0. We denote by D H n the set of values of G restricted to H n , that is D H n " tg 1 , . . . , g m u.
Definition 1. The function P defined on K is said to be coherent if and only if, for every integer n, for every finite subfamily F n of K and for every real numbers s 1 , . . . , s n , one has: min D H n ď 0 ď max D H n .
Notice that the condition min D H n ď 0 ď max D H n can be written in two equivalent ways: min D H n ď 0, or max D H n ě 0. As shown by Definition 1, a probability assessment is coherent if and only if, for any finite combination of n bets, it does not happen that the values g 1 , . . . , g m are all positive, or all negative (no Dutch Book). Further technical details on coherence of probability assessments on conditional events and on conditional random quantities are given in Appendix A.
Conditional random quantities and the notions of p-consistency and p-entailment
In what follows, if not specified otherwise, we will consider conditional random quantities which take values in a finite subset of r0, 1s. Based on the notions of p-consistency and p-entailment of Adams ([1]), which were formulated for conditional events in the setting of coherence (see, e.g., [43, 45, 48] ), we will generalize these notions to these conditional random quantities. Let X|H be a finite conditional random quantity and let tx 1 , . . . , x r u denote the set of possible values for the restriction of X to H. Then, X|H P r0, 1s if and only if x j P r0, 1s for each j " 1, . . . , r; indeed in this case coherence requires that PpX|Hq P r0, 1s (see, e.g., [50] ). Definition 2. Let F n " tX i |H i , i " 1, . . . , nu be a family of n conditional random quantities which take values in a finite subset of r0, 1s. Then, F n is p-consistent if and only if, the (prevision) assessment pµ 1 , µ 2 , . . . , µ n q " p1, 1, . . . , 1q on F n is coherent.
. . , nu p-entails a conditional random quantity X|H which takes values in a finite subset of r0, 1s, denoted by F n |ù p X|H, if and only if for any coherent (prevision) assessment pµ 1 , . . . , µ n , zq on F n Y tX|Hu it holds that: if µ 1 "¨¨¨" µ n " 1, then z " 1.
Of course, when F n p-entails X|H, there may be coherent assessments pµ 1 , . . . , µ n , zq with z ‰ 1, but in such case µ i ‰ 1 for at least one index i. We say that the inference from F n to X|H is p-valid if and only if F n |ù p X|H. Now, we generalize the notion of p-entailment between two finite families of conditional random quantities F and F 1 .
Definition 4. Given two p-consistent finite families of conditional random quantities F and F 1 , we say that F pentails F 1 if and only if F p-entails X|H, for every X|H P F 1 .
Transitivity property of p-entailment: Of course, p-entailment is transitive; that is, given three p-consistent families of conditional random quantities F ,
Remark 1. Notice that, from Definition 3, we trivially have that F p-entails X|H, for every X|H P F ; then, by Definition 4, it immediately follows
Remark 2. Notice that, if we consider conditional events instead of conditional random quantities, we recover the usual notions of p-consistency, p-entailment, and p-validity.
Centering
Given a conditional event B|A, if you assess PpB|Aq " x, then for the indicator of B|A we have B|A " AB`x s A (see Appendix Appendix A.3). Thus, when the conditioning event A is true then B|A has the same value as B and as AB, while, when the conditioning event A is false then B|A coincides with x " PpB|Aq. This aspect seems related to the notion of (strong) centering used in Lewis' logic ( [61] ) in order to assign truth values to counterfactuals. In Remark 3 of this section we will show that pB|Aq^A " AB, that is pB|Aq^A and AB are the same object; then, by the compound probability theorem, it holds that PrpB|Aq^As " PpABq " PpB|AqPpAq and then PrpB|Aq^As " PpABq ď PpB|Aq. This inequality also follows by the Goodman & Nguyen inclusion relation AB Ď B|A ([49, Theorem 6]). We recall that the equality PrpB|Aq^As " PpB|AqPpAq in [54] is named "the probabilistic version of centering" and it has been usually looked at as a probabilistic independence of the conditional if A then B from its premise A. We also recall that in [54, 
footnote 5] Hajek and Hall observe that "centering is a slight misnomer, since this name usually refers to a property of the nearness relation used to give the truth conditions for the conditional (each world is the nearest world to itself)"
2 . Interestingly, in [2] Adams has shown that the Lewis theory of nearest possible worlds can be interpreted as a theory of worlds nearest in probability; in other words, according to Adams' viewpoint, the Lewis logic may be considered as "the logic not of truth, but of high probability". By the previous remarks and in agreement with [54] (see also [53, p. 442 ]), we simply use the term centering also for the kind of inferences which we study in this paper.
There is one-premise centering: inferring if A then B from the single premise AB. And two-premise centering: inferring if A then B from the two separate premises A and B. Centering is valid for quite a wide range of conditionals ( [19, 20, 66] ). It is clearly valid for the material conditional, since not-A or B must be true when A and B is true. It is also valid for Lewis conditional if A then B ( [61] ), which holds, roughly, when B is true in the closest world in which A is true. In [61] Lewis has a semantic condition of centering, which states that the actual world is the closest world to itself. The characteristic axiom for this semantic condition is what we are also calling centering. It is probabilistically valid, p-valid, for the conditional event, i.e. AB p-entails B|A and tA, Bu p-entails B|A. Centering is, however, not valid for inferentialist accounts of conditionals, where an inferential relation between antecedent and consequent is presupposed (see, e.g., [23] ).
A (p-consistent) set of premises p-entails a conclusion if and only if the conclusion must have probability one when all the premises have probability one [48] . Clearly, one-premise centering is p-valid, indeed the p-entailment of B|A from AB follows by observing that PpABq " PpAqPpB|Aq and so PpABq ď PpB|Aq: if PpABq " 1, then PpB|Aq " 1. Two-premise centering is also clearly p-valid, as it is p-valid to infer AB from A and B, and then onepremise centering can be used to infer B|A: if PpAq " x and PpBq " y, coherence requires that PpABq has to be in the interval rmaxtx`y´1, 0u, mintx, yus, with PpABq ď PpB|Aq. Therefore, if PpAq " PpBq " 1, it follows PpABq " PpB|Aq " 1 and then tA, Bu p-entails B|A.
We will study the p-validity of generalized versions of one-premise and two-premise centering, where the unconditional events A and B are replaced by the conditional events A|H and B|K, respectively. These kinds of centering involve the notions of conjunction and of iterated conditioning for conditional events. Conjunction and iteration among conditionals have been studied from the viewpoint of random variables by many authors (see, e.g. [57, 58, 59, 85] ); for an overview on conditionals, see, e.g., [3, 25, 27] . In our approach we exploit recent results obtained in the setting of coherence for conditional random quantities (see, e.g. [46, 47, 50, 51] ).
Conjunction of two conditional events
We recall and discuss the notion of conjunction of two conditional events. Note that, in numerical terms, two conditional events A|H and B|K, with PpA|Hq " x and PpB|Kq " y, coincide with the random quantities AH`x s H and BK`y s K, respectively. Then, min tA|H, B|Ku " min tAH`x s H, BK`y s Ku.
Definition 5 (Conjunction). Given any pair of conditional events A|H and B|K, with PpA|Hq " x, PpB|Kq " y, we define their conjunction as the conditional random quantity
Then, defining z " PrpA|Hq^pB|Kqs, we have pA|Hq^pB|Kq "
From (4), the conjunction pA|Hq^pB|Kq is the following random quantity
Notice that the quantity z " PrpA|Hq^pB|Kqs represents the value that you assess, with the proviso that, for each real number s, you will pay the amount sz by receiving the random quantity srpA|Hq^pB|Kqs. In particular, if s " 1, then you agree to pay z with the proviso that you will receive: 1, if both conditional events are true; 0, if at least one of the conditional events is false; x, if A|H is void and B|K is true; y, if B|K is void and A|H is true; z, if both conditional events are void. Notice that this notion of conjunction, with positive probabilities for the conditioning events, has been already proposed in [63] .
Remark 3. We remark that in particular, given two events A and H, with H ‰ H, PpA|Hq " x, PpHq " y, PrpA|Hq^Hs " z, by (5) it holds that pA|Hq^H " pA|Hq^pH|Ωq " AHHΩ`x¨s HHΩ`y¨AHH`z¨s HH " AH.
Then, the conjunction pA|Hq^H is equivalent to the unconditional event AH and PrpA|Hq^Hs " PpAHq " PpA|HqPpHq.
Notice that the notion of conjunction given in Definition 5, with positive probabilities for the conditioning events, has been already proposed in the context of betting scheme in [63] . By linearity of prevision it holds that
in particular, if PpH _ Kq ą 0 we obtain the following result given in [59, 63] :
We recall that a well-known notion of conjunction among conditional events, which plays an important role in nonmonotonic reasoning, is the quasi conjunction [1, 6, 48] , i.e., the following conditional event:
The event AH _ s H is the material conditional associated with the conditional "if H then A". Then, the quasi conjunction is defined by taking the minimum of the material conditionals given H _ K. However, we define the conjunction by taking the minimum of the conditional events given H _ K. Our conjunction is (in general) a conditional random quantity, whereas the quasi conjunction is a conditional event. In some particular cases conjunction and quasi conjunction coincide; two cases examined in [47] are: piq x " y " 1; piiq K " AH (or symmetrically H " BK). Moreover, classical results concerning lower and upper bounds for the conjunction of unconditional events, which do not hold for the upper bound of the quasi conjunction ( [39, 49] ), still hold for our notion of conjunction. This is shown in the next result ( [50] ). Theorem 1. Given any coherent assessment px, yq on tA|H, B|Ku, with A, H, B, K logically independent, and with H ‰ H, K ‰ H, the extension z " PrpA|Hq^pB|Kqs is coherent if and only if the Fréchet-Hoeffding bounds are satisfied:
Remark 4. We recall that, by logical independence of A, H, B, K, the assessment px, yq is coherent for every px, yq P r0, 1s 2 . From Theorem 1, the set Π of all coherent assessment px, y, zq on F " tA|H, B|K, pA|Hq^pB|Kqu is Π " tpx, y, zq : px, yq P r0, 1s 2 , maxtx`y´1, 0u ď z ď mintx, yuu. Then, z P r0, 1s and pA|Hq^pB|Kq P r0, 1s. Moreover, as p1, 1, 1q P Π, the family F (and so each subfamily of F ) is p-consistent. In particular, if x " 1, y " 1, then z must be equal to 1. Then, by Definition 3, tA|H, B|Ku p-entails pA|Hq^pB|Kq, i.e., tA|H, B|Ku |ù p pA|Hq^pB|Kq .
We call this inference rule "AND rule for conditional events". We also notice that the assessment px, y, 1q P Π if and only if x " 1 and y " 1. Then, both x " 1 and y " 1 follow from z " 1, i.e. pA|Hq^pB|Kq |ù p tA|H, B|Ku, which is the converse of (8).
Remark 5. Assuming HK " H, it holds that the conjunction pA|Hq^pB|Kq coincides with the product pA|Hq¨pB|Kq; moreover PrpA|Hq^pB|Kqs " PrpA|Hq¨pB|Kqs " PpA|HqPpB|Kq, which states that the random quantities A|H and B|K are uncorrelated; more details are given in ( [50] ).
Iterated conditioning
We recall and discuss the notion of iterated conditioning.
Definition 6 (Iterated conditioning). Given any pair of conditional events A|H and B|K, the iterated conditional pB|Kq|pA|Hq is defined as the conditional random quantity pB|Kq|pA|Hq " pB|Kq^pA|Hq`µ s A|H, where µ " PrpB|Kq|pA|Hqs.
Notice that, in the context of betting scheme, µ represents the amount you agree to pay, with the proviso that you will receive the quantity pB|Kq|pA|Hq "
We recall the following product formula ( [47] ).
Theorem 2 (Product formula). Given any assessment x " PpA|Hq, µ " PrpB|Kq|pA|Hqs, z " PrpB|Kq^pA|Hqs, if px, µ, zq is coherent, then z " µ¨x, i.e.,
PrpB|Kq^pA|Hqs " PrpB|Kq|pA|HqsPpA|Hq .
As z " µx, it follows that z`µp1´xq " µ. Then, from (9), pB|Kq|pA|Hq coincides with
Remark 6. As x ě z, for x ą 0 one has µ " z x P r0, 1s; moreover x`µp1´xq is a linear convex combination of the values µ and 1, then x`µp1´xq P rµ, 1s. Therefore, for x ą 0, pB|Kq|pA|Hq P r0, 1s. As shown in Theorem 4, µ P r0, 1s also for x " 0. Thus, pB|Kq|pA|Hq P r0, 1s in all cases.
One-premise and two-premise centering: p-validity
The one-premise centering involving conditional events is represented by the following inference rule: from pA|Hq^pB|Kq infer pB|Kq|pA|Hq. Likewise, two-premise centering involving conditional events is represented by: from tA|H, B|Ku infer pB|Kq|pA|Hq. Are these inference rules p-valid?
One-premise centering is p-valid; indeed, from (10) it holds that
PrpB|Kq^pA|Hqs ď PrpB|Kq|pA|Hqs,
then PrpB|Kq^pA|Hqs " 1 implies PrpB|Kq|pA|Hqs " 1, i.e., pB|Kq^pA|Hq |ù p pB|Kq|pA|Hq.
Two-premise centering is also p-valid; indeed, from (8) and (12), by transitivity, tpA|Hq, pB|Kqu |ù p pB|Kq|pA|Hq,
that is, if PpA|Hq " 1 and PpB|Kq " 1, then PrpB|Kq|pA|Hqs " 1.
Lower and upper bounds for two-premise centering
In this section we give a probabilistic analysis of two-premise centering by determining the coherent lower and upper bounds for the conclusion. We first consider the general case: from tA|H, B|Ku infer pB|Kq|pA|Hq. Then, we consider two-premise centering with unconditional events in the premise set: from tA, Bu infer B|A, which is a particular case where H " K " Ω.
The general case: "from tA|H, B|Ku infer pB|Kq|pA|Hq"
We start by computing the set of all coherent assessments on the elements of centering.
Theorem 3. Let A, B, H, K be any logically independent events. The set Π of all coherent assessments px, y, z, µq on the family F " tA|H, B|K, pA|Hq^pB|Kq, pB|Kq|pA|Hqu is Π " Π 1 Y Π 2 , where Π 1 " tpx, y, z, µq : x P p0, 1s, y P r0, 1s, z P rz 1 , z 2 s, µ " z x u, with z 1 " maxtx`y´1, 0u, z 2 " mintx, yu, and Π 2 " tp0, y, 0, µq : py, µq P r0, 1s 2 u.
Proof. We recall that the assessment px, yq on tA|H, B|Ku is coherent for every px, yq P r0, 1s 2 . By Theorem 1, the assessment z " PrpA|Hq^pB|Kqs is a coherent extension of px, yq if and only if z P rz 1 , z 2 s, where z 1 " maxtx`y1 , 0u and z 2 " mintx, yu. Moreover, assuming x ą 0, by Theorem 2 it holds that µ " z x . Then, every px, y, z, µq P Π 1 is coherent, that is Π 1 Ď Π. Of course, if x ą 0 and px, y, z, µq R Π 1 , then px, y, z, µq is not coherent. Now, we assume x " 0, so that z 1 " z 2 " 0. Then, we show that the assessment p0, y, 0, µq is coherent if and only if py, µq P r0, 1s 2 , that is p0, y, 0, µq P Π 2 . As x " 0, it holds that A|H " AH`x s H " AH. Then, pB|Kq|pA|Hq " pB|Kq|AH " pBK`y s Kq|AH and F " tA|H, B|K, pA|Hq^pB|Kq, pBK`y s
Kq|AHu. The constituents C h 's and the points Q h 's associated with pF , Mq, where M " p0, y, 0, µq, are given in Table 1 . Denoting by I be the convex hull generated by Q 1 , Q 2 , . . . , Q 8 , the coherence of the prevision assessment M on F requires that the condition P P I be satisfied; this amounts to the solvability of the following system
As M " yQ 4`p 1´yqQ 5 , the vector pλ 1 , . . . , λ 8 q " p0, 0, 0, y, 1´y, 0, 0, 0q is a solution of system (15) such that
Kq|AHu. Thus, from Theorem 13, for checking coherence of M on F it is sufficient to study the coherence of µ " PptpBK`y s Kq|AHuq. The random gain for the assessment µ is
Without loss of generality, we can assume s " 1. The constituents contained in AH are:
The corresponding values for the random gain G are: g 1 " p1´µq, g 2 "´µ, g 3 " y´µ. Then, the set of values of G restricted to AH is D AH " tg 1 , g 2 , g 3 u. As it can be verified,
Therefore, the condition of coherence on µ, that is min D AH¨m ax D AH ď 0, is satisfied if and only if µ P r0, 1s. Thus, every assessment p0, y, 0, µq is coherent if and only if p0, y, 0, µq P Π 2 " tp0, y, 0, µq : py, µq P r0, 1s 2 u. Therefore
Based on Theorem 3, we obtain the following prevision propagation rule for two-premise centering:
Theorem 4. Let A, B, H, K be any logically independent events. Given a coherent assessment px, yq on tA|H, B|Ku, for the iterated conditional pB|Kq|pA|Hq the extension µ " PppB|Kq|pA|Hqq is coherent if and only if µ P rµ 1 , µ 2 s, where
Proof. Assume that x " 0. From Theorem 3 it follows that the set of all coherent assessments px, y, z, µq on F " tA|H, B|K, pA|Hq^pB|Kq, pB|Kq|pA|Hqu is Π 2 " tp0, y, 0, µq : py, µq P r0, 1s 2 u. Then, µ is a coherent extension of px, yq if and only if µ P rµ 1 , µ 2 s, where µ 1 " 0 and µ 2 " 1. Assume that x ą 0. From Theorem 3 it follows that the set of all coherent assessments px, y, z, µq on F is
Then, µ is a coherent extension of px, yq if and only if µ P rµ 1 , µ 2 s, where
( .
Remark 7.
The p-validity of two-premise centering given in (13) directly follows as an instantiation of Theorem 4 with x " 1 and y " 1.
The case H " K " Ω
In case of logical dependencies among events, as we know, the set of all coherent assessments may be smaller than the set given in Theorem 3. We examine the case H " K " Ω, by showing that the set Π of all coherent assessments on F " tA, B, AB, B|Au is still the same as in Theorem 3.
Theorem 5. Let A, B be any logically independent events. The set Π of all coherent assessments px, y, z, µq on the family F " tA, B, AB, B|Au is Π " Π 1 Y Π 2 , with Π 1 and Π 2 as defined in formula (14) .
Proof. We recall that the assessment px, yq on tA, Bu is coherent for every px, yq P r0, 1s 2 . The assessment z " PpABq is a coherent extension of px, yq if and only if z P rz 1 , z 2 s, where z 1 " maxtx`y´1, 0u and z 2 " mintx, yu. Moreover, assuming x ą 0, by compound probability theorem it holds that µ " z x . Then, every px, y, z, µq P Π 1 is coherent, that is Π 1 Ď Π. Of course, if x ą 0 and px, y, z, µq R Π 1 , then px, y, z, µq is not coherent. Now, we assume x " 0, so that z 1 " z 2 " 0. Then, we show that the assessment p0, y, 0, µq is coherent if and only if py, µq P r0, 1s 2 , that is p0, y, 0, µq P Π 2 . The constituents C h 's and the points Q h 's associated with pF , Pq, where P " p0, y, 0, µq, are given in Table 2 . Denoting by I the convex hull generated by Q 1 , Q 2 , Q 3 , Q 4 , the coherence of the prevision assessment P Table 2 : Constituents C h 's and points Q h 's associated with the probability assessment P " p0, y, 0, µq on F " tA, B, AB, B|Au.
on F requires that the condition P P I be satisfied; this amounts to the solvability of the following system
As P " yQ 3`p 1´yqQ 4 , the vector pλ 1 , . . . , λ 4 q " p0, 0, y, 1´yq is a solution of system (17), with ř h:C h ĎA λ h " 0. Then, by (A.2), I 0 Ď t4u and F 0 Ď tB|Au. Thus, from Theorem 13, for checking coherence of P on F it is sufficient to study the coherence of µ " PpB|Aq. Of course, µ " PpB|Aq is coherent if and only if µ P r0, 1s. Thus, every assessment p0, y, 0, µq is coherent if and only if p0, y, 0, µq P Π 2 " tp0, y, 0, µq : py, µq P r0, 1s 2 u. Therefore
Based on Theorem 5, we obtain the following prevision propagation rule for two-premise centering with unconditional events in the premise set: Theorem 6. Let A, B be any logically independent events. Given a coherent assessment px, yq on tA, Bu, for the conditional event B|A the extension µ " PpB|Aq is coherent if and only if µ P rµ 1 , µ 2 s, where
Proof. The proof is the same of Theorem 4, with F " tA, B, AB, B|Au and with Theorem 3 replaced by Theorem 5.
Remark 8. As shown by theorems 4 and 6, the lower and upper bounds on the conclusion of two-premise centering involving iterated conditionals coincide with the respective bounds on the conclusion of the (non-iterated) two-premise centering.
Biconditional centering
In classical logic the biconditional A Ø B (defined by Ğ pA _ Bq _ pABq) can be represented by the conjunction of the two material conditionals s A _ B and s
, which is called biconditional introduction rule. With the material conditional interpretation of a conditional, the biconditional A Ø B represents the conjunction of the two conditionals if A then B and if B then A. In this section, we present an analogue in terms of conditional events, by also giving a meaning to the conjunction of two conditional events A|B and B|A.
From centering it follows that tA, Bu |ù p B|A and tA, Bu |ù p A|B. Then, from PpAq " PpBq " 1 it follows that PpB|Aq " PpA|Bq " 1, which we denote by: tA, Bu |ù p tA|B, B|Au. Thus, by applying (8) with H " B and K " A, we obtain tA|B, B|Au |ù p pA|Bq^pB|Aq (which we call biconditional introduction rule, or biconditional AND rule). Then, by transitivity tA, Bu |ù p pA|Bq^pB|Aq .
In a similar way, we can prove that AB |ù p pA|Bq^pB|Aq .
We recall that the conditional event pABq | pA _ Bq, denoted by A||B, captures the notion of the biconditional event, which has been seen as the conjunction of two conditionals with the same truth table as the "defective" biconditional discussed in [32] ; see also [30] . We have Theorem 7. Given two events A and B it holds that: pA|Bq^pB|Aq " pABq|pA _ Bq " A||B.
Proof. We note that pA|Bq^pB|Aq " minpA|B, B|Aq|pA _ Bq " AB`µ¨s A s B, where µ " PrpA|Bq^pB|Aqs; we also observe that pABq|pA _ Bq " AB`p¨s A s B, where p " PrpABq|pA _ Bqs. Then, under the assumption that "pA _ Bq is true", the two random quantities pA|Bq^pB|Aq and pABq|pA _ Bq coincide. By coherence (see [50, Theorem 4] ) it follows that these two random quantities coincide also under the assumption that "pA _ Bq is false", that is µ and p coincide. Therefore, pA|Bq^pB|Aq " pABq|pA _ Bq.
Based on Theorem 7, we can now really interpret the biconditional event A||B as the conjunction of the two conditionals pB|Aq and pA|Bq. Moreover, equations (18) and (19) represent what we call two-premise biconditional centering and one-premise biconditional centering respectively, that is tA, Bu |ù p A||B and AB |ù p A||B.
Though in classical logic t s A, s Bu |ù pA Ø Bq, the analogue does not hold in our approach, since we do not have pentailment of A||B from s A, s B, indeed if Pp s Aq " Pp s Bq " 1, then PpA _ Bq " 0 and therefore PpA||Bq " PppABq|pA _ Bqq P r0, 1s (see Theorem 8 below). The biconditional event A||B is of interest to psychologists because there is evidence that children go through a developmental stage in which they judge that Ppif A then Bq " PrpABq|pA _ Bqs, with this judgment being replaced by P(if A then B) = PpB|Aq as they grow older ( [32] ). We recall that, given two conditional events A|H and B|K, their quasi conjunction is defined as the conditional event QpA|H, B|Kq " rpAH _ s Hq^pBK _ s Kqs|pH _ Kq. Quasi conjunction is a basic notion in the work of Adams ( [1] ) and plays a role in characterizing entailment from a conditional knowledge base (see also [6] ). We recall that in [49] A||B was interpreted by the quasi conjunction of A|B and B|A, by obtaining A||B " QpA|B, B|Aq " pABq|pA _ Bq.
Lower and upper bounds for two-premise biconditional centering
In this section we determine the lower and upper bounds for the conclusion of two premise biconditional centering. 4 Theorem 8. Let A, B be any logically independent events. Given any (coherent) assessment px, yq P r0, 1s 2 on tA, Bu, for the biconditional event A||B the extension z " PpA||Bq is coherent if and only if z P rz 1 , z 2 s, where
, if x ą 0 or y ą 0, 1, if x " 0 and y " 0.
Proof. We consider two cases: piq x ą 0 or y ą 0; piiq x " 0 and y " 0. Case piq. As PpA _ Bq ě maxtx, yu, it follows that PpA _ Bq ą 0. Then, defining ν " PpABq, one has PpA||Bq " PpABq PpA_Bq " ν x`y´ν . We recall that ν is a coherent extension px, yq if and only if ν P rν 1 , ν 2 s, where
y´ν is an increasing function of ν, it follows that the assessment z " PpA||Bq is a coherent extension of px, yq if and only if z P rz 1 , z 2 s, where
" maxtx`y´1, 0u, and
. We observe that if x " 0 or
The constituents C h 's, h " 1, 2, 3, 4, associated with the assessment p0, 0, zq on tA, B, AB|pA _ Bqu, and the corresponding points Q h 's are C 1 " AB, C 2 " A s B, C 3 " s AB, C 4 " s A s B, and Q 1 " p1, 1, 1q, Q 2 " p1, 0, 0q, Q 3 " p0, 1, 0q, Q 4 " p0, 0, zq, respectively. As the prevision point p0, 0, zq coincides with Q 4 , then it belongs to the convex hull of points Q 1 , . . . , Q 4 , that is the associated system pΣq, as defined in Section 2.2, is solvable. As PpA _ Bq ď mintx`y, 1u " 0, each solution pλ 1 , . . . , λ 4 q of pΣq is such that ř h:C h ĎA_B λ h " λ 1`λ2`λ3 " 0, so that I 0 " t3u. By Theorem 13, p0, 0, zq is coherent if and only if z is coherent, which amounts to z P r0, 1s.
Reversed inferences and bounds on biconditional AND rule
In this section we first recall the lower and upper bounds on the conclusion of the biconditional AND rule. Then, we study the reverse inferences from the prevision assessment on the conclusion A||B " pA|Bq^pB|Aq to the premises tA|B, B|Au. That is, starting with a given assessment z P r0, 1s on A||B, we determine the set D z of all coherent extensions px, yq, where x " PpA|Bq and y " PpB|Aq. We recall the following probabilistic propagation rule ( [49] ). Let px, yq be any coherent assessment on tA|B, B|Au; then, the probability assessment z " PpA||Bq is a coherent extension of px, yq if and only if 
where T H 0 px, yq is the Hamacher t-norm, with parameter λ " 0. We obtain Theorem 9. Let A, B be any logically independent events. Given any assessment z P r0, 1s on A||B, the extension px, yq on tA|B, B|Au is coherent if and only if px, yq P D z , where
Proof. From (21) the set Π of all coherent assessments px, y, zq on tA|B, B|A, A||Bu is Π " tpx, y, zq : px, yq P r0,
Assume that z " 0. We notice that the assessment px, y, 0q P Π if and only if x " 0 or y " 0, with px, yq P r0, 1s 2 . Then, D 0 " tpx, yq P r0, 1s
2 : x " 0 or y " 0u. Assume that 0 ă z ď 1. By Goodman and Nguyen inclusion relation among conditional events, as AB|pA _ Bq Ď A|B and AB|pA _ Bq Ď B|A, coherence requires that (see, e.g., [49, Theorem 6 ]) x ě z ą 0 and y ě z ą 0; thus xy ą 0, x`y´xy ą 0, and x´z`xz ą 0. Then, from (21) and (22) it holds that z " Remark 9. Based on Theorem 9, the set Π of all coherent assessments px, y, zq on tA|B, B|A, A||Bu can also be written as Π " tpx, y, zq : z P r0, 1s, px, yq P D z u.
Moreover, by symmetry, we observe that, if z ą 0, the set D z in Theorem 9 can also be written as D z " tpx, yq P r0, 1s 2 : z ď y ď 1, x " yz y´z`yz u.
Two-premise centering with logical relations and counterfactuals
In this section we consider an instance of two premise-centering, with a logical dependency, that can be used to study some counterfactuals. Specifically, we consider the inference: tB|Ω, C|Au p-entails pC|Aq|pB|Ωq, with AB " H. As B|Ω " B, this inference can be simply written as tB, C|Au |ù p pC|Aq|B, with AB " H.
We first show that, assuming PpBq ą 0, the prevision of the conclusion pC|Aq|B coincides just with PpC|Aq, i.e., PrpC|Aq|Bs " PpC|Aq. By (5) the conjunction of B and C|A reduces to the random quantity pC|Aq|B " yB, where y " PpC|Aq. Then, by linearity of the prevision, PrpC|Aq^Bs " PpC|AqPpBq. Moreover, by (10) , it holds that PrpC|Aq^Bs " PrpC|Aq|BsPpBq and then, by assuming PpBq ą 0, we obtain
Now we show that (24) holds in general, even if PpBq " 0, by also showing that the iterated conditional pC|Aq|B is constant and coincides with PpC|Aq, when AB " H. As pC|Aq^B " yB, by Definition 6, pC|Aq|B " yB`µ s B. Moreover, as B Ď s A, conditionally on B being true, it holds that: C|A " AC`y s A " y; that is, when B is true, C|A is constant and equal to y. Then, by coherence, µ " PrpC|Aq|Bs " PrpAC`y s Aq|Bs " Ppy|Bq " y (see [46, Remark 1] ). Therefore, when AB " H it holds that pC|Aq|B " yB`y s B " y, i.e., the iterated conditional pC|Aq|B is constant and equal to PpC|Aq. Then, trivially, when AB " H it holds that PrpC|Aq|Bs " PpC|Aq, i.e. the prevision of the iterated conditional "if B then (if A then C)" coincides with the probability of "(if A then C)". Therefore, the probability of B does not play a role in propagating the uncertainty from the premise set tB, C|Au to the conclusion pC|Aq|B. In particular, if B " s A, then pC|Aq| s A " PpC|Aq. This result can be used as a model for some instances of counterfactuals. Counterfactuals are conditionals in the subjunctive mood, which people usually use when they believe that the antecedents are false. For example, the assertion of "If the glass had fallen from the table, then it would have broken" conversationally implies that the speaker believes that the glass did not fall. Counterfactuals are important for causal reasoning and for hypothetical thinking in general. There is experimental evidence that people judge the probability of a counterfactual, "If A were the case, then C would be the case", as the conditional probability, PpC|Aq [68, 78, 80] . Moreover, when presented with causal, e.g., "If a patient were to take certain drug, the symptoms would diminish", or non-causal task material, e.g., "If the card were to show a square, it would be black", people judge the negations of the antecedents to be irrelevant to the evaluation of the counterfactuals [78, 80] . These negations state the actual facts, e.g., "The patient does not take the drug", or "The side does not show a square", respectively. This speaks for the psychological plausibility of our basic intuition, which also underlies Stalnaker's extension of the Ramsey test to counterfactuals [26, 29, 84] : when we evaluate the counterfactual "If A were the case, C would be the case", we hypothetically remove, or set aside, our information that A is false from our beliefs and assess C under the assumption that A is true. This matches the psychological data [78, 80] . One starting point of modeling such situations is given by the aforementioned iterated conditional pC|Aq|B, with B Ď s A, where B represents the factual statement which provides evidence that s A. We remark that, contrary to [63] , in general the iterated conditional pC|Aq|B, when A, B, C are logically independent, does not coincide with the conditional event C|AB. Indeed, by setting PrpC|Aq|Bs " µ and PpC|Aq " y, from Definition 6 we obtain
B is true, while, assuming AB ‰ H and PpC|ABq " z, it holds that
thus: pC|Aq|B ‰ C|AB. Moreover, as pC|Aq|B " pAC`y s Aq|B " AC|B`y s A|B, by linearity of prevision and product formula PrpC|Aq|Bs " PpC|ABqPpA|Bq`PpC|AqPp s A|Bq.
Therefore, like in [1, 59] , the Import-Export Principle is not valid in our approach. Then, as proved in [50] , we avoid the counter-intuitive consequences related to Lewis' well-known first triviality result ( [62] ). Moreover, if the Import-Export Principle were added as an axiom to our theory, assuming AB " H, A ‰ H, B ‰ H, we would have on one hand pC|Aq|B " PpC|Aq; on the other hand it would be pC|Aq|B " C|AB " C|H; thus, we would obtain an inconsistency. We also recall that, following de Finetti, objects like C|H are not considered in our approach. Finally, we point out that we are able to manage counterfactuals; indeed, in our approach the counterfactual C|A when A is believed to be false is not C|H, but pC|Aq| s A, which coincides with PpC|Aq.
Conclusions
We have presented a probabilistic analysis of the conjunction and iteration of conditional events, and of the centering inference for these conjunctions and iterations. In our approach conjoined conditionals and iterated conditionals are conditional random quantities defined in the setting of coherence. By this approach we can overcome some objections made in the past to the conditional probability hypothesis for natural language conditionals, that Ppif A then Bq " PpB|Aq. This hypothesis is fundamental for the new Bayesian and probabilistic approaches in the psychology of reasoning and has been confirmed in many papers ( [65, 67, 73, 74, 75, 79, 81] ). This identity is also central to our analysis of both indicative and counterfactual conditionals as conditional events.
We have proved the p-validity of one-premise and two-premise centering when basic events are replaced by conditional events. We have determined the lower and upper bounds for the conclusion of two-premise centering; we have also studied the classical case and have obtained the same lower and upper bounds. We have proved the p-validity of an analogue of the classical biconditional introduction rule for conditional events (biconditional AND rule). We have verified the p-validity of one-premise and two-premise biconditional centering, and have given the lower and upper bounds for the conclusion of two-premise biconditional centering. We have investigated reversed inferences, by determining the lower and upper bounds for the premises of the biconditional AND rule. We have briefly indicated how to apply our results to the study of selected counterfactuals.
It is often argued that there are deep differences between indicative and counterfactual conditionals. For example, the indicative conditional, "If Oswald did not kill Kennedy then someone else did", is not equivalent to the counterfactual conditional, "If Oswald had not killed Kennedy then someone else would have" ( [26] ). We will explore in future work the more detailed similarities and differences between these two forms of the conditional.
subset J of J n , we denote by pF J , P J q the pair associated with J and by pΣ J q the corresponding system. We observe that pΣ J q is solvable if and only if P J P I J , where I J is the convex hull associated with the pair pF J , P J q. Then, we have ( [35, Theorem 3.2] ; see also [9, 36] ) Theorem 11. Given a probability assessment P n on the family F n , if the system pΣq associated with pF n , P n q is solvable, then for every J Ă J n , such that JzI 0 ‰ H, the system pΣ J q associated with pF J , P J q is solvable too.
The previous result says that the condition P n P I implies P J P I J when JzI 0 ‰ H. We observe that, if P n P I, then for every nonempty subset J of J n zI 0 it holds that JzI 0 " J ‰ H; hence, by Theorem 10, the subassessment P J n zI 0 on the subfamily F J n zI 0 is coherent. In particular, when I 0 is empty, coherence of P n amounts to solvability of system pΣq, that is to condition P n P I. When I 0 is not empty, coherence of P n amounts to the validity of both conditions P n P I and P 0 coherent, as shown below ( [35, Theorem 3.3] ).
Theorem 12. The assessment P n on F n is coherent if and only if the following conditions are satisfied: (i) P n P I; (ii) if I 0 ‰ H, then P 0 is coherent.
Given the assessment M n " pµ 1 , . . . , µ n q on F n " tX 1 |H 1 , . . . , X n |H n u, let S be the set of solutions Λ " pλ 1 , . . . , λ m q of system (A.1). Then, assuming the system (A.1) solvable, that is S ‰ H, we define: 
